L'Imaginaire, Psychologie Phenomenologique de l'Imagination, by Jean-Paul Sartre, Librairie Gallimard (Paris, 1940), 28th ed. trans. as The Psychology of the Imagination by Rider (London, 1951), Citadel Press (New York, 1961), Washington Square Press (????)
bottom: The well-documented occurence of precognitive images is fatal to the whole of Sartre's theory of images, and thus to the whole of his philosophy. This does not make him worthless reading.
[If the imagining consciousness of a tree, for example, were only conscious as an object of reflexion, the result would be that in the unreflexive state consciousness would be unconscious of itself, which is a contradiction. Therefore, though it has no other object than the tree's image and is itself an object only for reflexion, it must contain a certain consciousness of itself. We shall say that it has an immanent and non-thetic consciousness of itself.]: This mystical device is designed to avoid an unavoidable infinite hierarchy of pre-reflexive consciousnesses. Elaborated inL'Êtreet le Néant.
[When the properly imagining consciousness vanished, there was left a sensible residue which could be described, namely the painted canvas or the spot on the wall.]:This unjustified assumption is the source of the En-soi-Pur. You cannot get apodictic knowledge after the experience has ceased.
[The matter of my imagined consciousness of the portrait was obviously this painted canvas.] 'évidemment' (obviously) u/l: No.
[Husserl described outstandingly those particular intentions which, from a living and concrete now, head for an immediate past to hold it back and for an immediate future to seize it. He calls them 'retentions' and 'protentions'.]: Cf. L'Être et le Néant, p. 145 & pp. 152-3.
[To these visual impressions constituted in a motionless form are joined some impressions purely kineothesic (articular, tendinous, muscular, cutaneous feelings) which accompany them without being noticed.]: Cf. L'Être et le Néant, pp. 388-9.
[Obviously I perceive the rest always more and differently than I see it.]: How do you know what you see, if it is not what you perceive? Voir here means the bare seeing of unadorned reality. This is a pure invention, Sartre's fundamental mistake.
[These objects are neither heavy nor pressing nor exacting. They are pure passivity. They await. The feeble life we blow into them comes from us, from our spontaneity. If we turn away from them they vanish utterly. We shall see in the following chapter that they are completely inactive. Being ultimate terms, they are never terms of origin. Even between themselves they are neither cause nor effect.]: This completely ignores telepathic and clairvoyant images.
[One knows that the majority of our dreams are very short.]: How?
[No doubt with most people the affective element which constitutes the analogue is reduced to a simple emotional abstract.] 'abstrait emotionnel' u/l: Cf. L'Être et le Néant, p. 396.
[But this unreal so well specified and defined is a void; or if we prefer, it is a simple reflection of feeling. This feeling, thus, sustains itself in its own reflection.]: This won't do. Compare S.P.R. Proceedings vol. XLIII, pp. 176-180.
L'EN pp. 145, 152-3, 388-9 and 396 correspond to pp. 100, 109-110, 323-325 and 330 of Being and Nothingness.